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An Anti-Monopoly Legal Regime in the Making
in China as a Socialist Market Economy
ZHANG XAN,-CHU*

In the course of dynamic market development in the People's Republic of China (PRC),
antimonopoly legislation has increasingly received both domestic and international attention, and has become a crucial criterion to test the level playing field and the government's
commitment to a free market economy.' After three decades of economic liberalization
and reform, particularly after China's accession to the World Trade Organization (VTO),
a sound antimonopoly legal regime has never been of such great importance to domestic
2
consumers, private entrepreneurs and foreign investors as it is today. The Chinese government has recognized that an anti-monopoly law is a fundamental legal institution, necessary to ensure effective market resource distribution on a fair, open, and predictable
basis. The adoption of the law as the "economic constitution" will be crucial to deepening
3
reform in China, and promoting its international trade and economic cooperation.
Against this backdrop, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
adopted the Antimonopoly Law (AML) on August 30, 2007, effective August 1, 2008, for
4
the first time in the history of the PRC.
This article provides a critical examination of the development of the antimonopoly
legal regime in China. Part one sets out the background and difficulties in developing the
legislation; part two reviews the major provisions of the AML and some detailed implementing rules; part three highlights some unsettled issues and the continuing debates concerning the implementation of the law; part four reflects on certain political and
* Professor of Law, The University of Hong Kong. The author would like to express his gratitude to the
Research Grant Committee of the University of Hong Kong and the Mrs. Li Ka Shing Fund of the
University of Hong Kong for their kind support to his research project.
1. Sundeep Tucker & Patti Waldmeir, Deal on Hold?, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 29, 2008, at 9, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3336b2ba-5ccf- 1 ldd-8d38-000077b07658,dwp-uuid=89fe9472-9c7f-1 lda-87620000779e2340.html.
2. For example, in the recent overview of sectoral dialogues between China and the European Commission, it is stated that "[c]ompetition policy is a crucial issue in the context of China's efforts to restructure its
economy." EUROPEAN COALMISSION, Ex-rEP AL RELATIONS CHINA (2008), http://ec.europa.eu/externalrelations/china/sectoraldialogue-en.htm#Competitionpolicy.
3. Explanation on the Draft Anti-monopoly Law (statement of Cao Kangtai, Dir. of the Legislative Office
of the State Council) 2007 STANDINrG Co.-vt. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. 265, 523-24 (P.R.C.).
4. Anti-monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) LAWL'.oCHINA (last visited Aug. 4, 2009) (P.R.C.).
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infrastructural features of China that may affect the enforcement of the AML in practice;
and finally, part five provides some concluding remarks.

1.

The Legislative Background

In the course of opening up and reform, a drafting group designed to confront the antimonopoly issue was first formed in 1987 within the Legislative Office of the State Council; however, the group only produced a draft of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law as a
half-done product in 1993.5 The legislative process was not resumed until 1994, when the
State Council established a working group to further study the competition policy of the
country. 6 It took more than a decade of effort to finally submit the draft AML to the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for "the first read" on June 24,
2006 (2006 Draft).7 The legislative deliberation was also a process of difficult labor
marked by sharp controversies.
It should be noted that China embarked on its undertaking to establish an antimonopoly regime with social, political, economic, and legal conditions quite different from
those of other developed or developing markets. Subject to a socialist country ruled by
the totalitarian government of the Communist Party with a planned economy for over
thirty years, the current reform has not allowed the market disciplines and competition
culture to really take their roots in the country.8 Due to a lack of independence and
experience in dealing with emerging issues in market developments, the People's Courts
have played a limited role in developing the framework of competition law. Moreover,
the reluctance of the government at all levels to give up their powers in market reform,
and local firms' heavy reliance on local government protectionism has made the administrative power on the market even stronger in certain sectors in recent years.9 As a result,
local protectionism and administrative monopoly are considered the most serious obstacles to the development of an antimonopoly regime in China.' 0
The long delay of adopting the AML, however, does not mean that there was no action
in this regard during the period. The government promulgated quite a few national laws
and administrative regulations, as well as government policies, to address different anti5. H. MYnRS, HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, OFFIciAL REPORT OF PROCEEDING, WEDNESDAY

(1987).
6. MARK WILLIAMS, COMPETITION POLICY & LAW IN CIINA, HONG KONG & TAIWAN 173 (2005).

7. Hu Yuanyuan, China Okays Draft Anti-monopoly Law, CHI-NA DAILY, June 8, 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/08/content_611238.htm.
8. Lucian W. Pye, An Overview of 50 Years of the People's Republic of China: Some Progress, but Big Problems
Remain, 159 CHINA QUARTERLY 569, (1999); William C. Jones, Trying to Understandthe Current Chinese Legal
System, in UNDERSTANDING CmINA'S LEGAL Sys-iv, 7-45, (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003).
9. Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 6 (2006).
10. See C-AOWUJIN & WEi Luo, COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA 208 (2002) (stating "the administrative
monopoly disturbs the market economy more than the economic monopoly does."); Vivienne Bath, Reducing
the Role of Gov't-The Chinese Experiment, 3 ASIAN J.Comp. L., art. 9 (2008), http://www.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1104&context=asjcl

(arguing that despite the substantial progress, the government

still has its strong hand on the market); Zhuoyao Hui, Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: a Pretext for Local Protection
or an Aspiration to comply with the International Norm?, ILL. Bus. L.J.(2007), available at http://iblsjournal.typepad.com/illinois-business.law-soc/2007/1 l/chinese-anti-mo.html#more (stating that administrative monopoly and local protectionism are two major concerns in China's anti-monopoly legislation).
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monopoly concerns." For example, the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of 1993, the Law
on Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests of 1993, the Advertising Law of 1994, the
Price Law of 1997, the Bidding Law of 1999, the Government Procurement Law of 2002
and the Law on Ports of 2003, and the Foreign Trade Law of 2004 all include provisions
to deal with monopolies or related practices. In addition, several government authorities
have promulgated numerous administrative decrees in different business areas during the
past two decades.12 Furthermore, the central government issued several policy decrees in
order to deal with some pressing tensions between local governments on market access
13
and distribution.
Despite these notable efforts, all of these enactments and administrative measures suffer
fundamental and intrinsic defects. First, the piecemeal approach to legislation failed to
develop a coherent competition policy and legal system. Second, the vague and general
provisions made application and enforcement of the regulations ineffective. in many such
enactments, a one-sentence provision prohibiting monopolist or anti-unfair competition
conducts looks more like an empty policy statement than a legal rule with real enforceabil14
ity. Most of the provisions do not include definitions, handling procedures, or penalties.
Third, certain provisions actually restricted, rather than promoted, healthy market competition. For instance, the State Planning Commission and the State Commission of
Economy and Trade, in their Provisions to Curb Dumping Industrial Products at Predatory Price of 1998, required state authorities in different trades to use the average cost of
the trade as the admonitory line of self-discipline in determining the existence of dumping

11. See Steven L. Snell, The Development of Competition Policy in the People's Republic of China, 28 N.Y.U. J.
INrr'L L. & POL. 575, 577 (1996).
12. The Decisions of the State Council on Rectifying & Standardizing the Order in the Market Econ., Art.
II § 7 (promulgated by the State Council, Apr. 27, 2001, effective Apr. 27, 2001) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited
Aug. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.); Anti-Dumping & Countervailing Rules (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 25,
1997, effective Mar. 25, 1997) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Aug 28, 2009) (P.R.C.); Interim Provisions on
Preventing the Acts of Price Monopoly (promulgated by the State Dev. and Reform Comm'n, June 18, 2003,
effective Nov. 1, 2003) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Aug. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.); Provisions on the Admin. Punishment of Price-related Violations, Art. 4 § 2 (promulgated by the State Dev. and Planning Comm'n, Aug. 1,
1999, effective Aug. 1, 1999) LAwLNFoCI UNA (last visited Aug. 28, 2009) (P.R.C.); Certain Regulations on
Prohibiting Anti-conspetitive practices of Public Enters, (promulgated by the State Admin. for Indus. &
Commerce, Dec. 24, 1993, effective Dec. 24, 1993) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Aug. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.).
13. Decisions of the State Council on Rectifying and Standardizing the Order in the Market Economy
(promulgated by the State Council, Apr. 27, 2001, effective Apr. 27, 2001) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Aug.
28, 2008) (P.R.C.); Provisions of the State Council On Prohibiting Regional Blockade in Market Economy
Activities (promulgated by the State Council, Apr. 21, 2001, effective Apr. 21, 2001) LAWINFOCHINA (last
visited Aug. 28, 2008) (P.R.C.); The Interim Provisions on Developing and Protection of Socialist Competition of (promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 17, 1980, effective Oct. 17, 1980) LAWINFOCHINA (last
visited Aug. 28, 2009) (P.R.C).
14. See Law on Ports (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., June 28, 2003, effective
Jan. 1, 2004) art. 29 LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Aug. 28, 2009) (P.R.C.) (stating "ltlhe State encourages and
protects fair competition in the activities of business operation of port. A business operator of port shall not
commit any monopoly act or unfair competition act, and shall not force others by any means to accept the
port services it provides."); Advertising Law (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27,
1994, effective Feb. 1, 1995) art. 21 LA\VINFoCiiNA (last visited Aug. 28, 2009) (P.R.C) (stating "[i[n carrying out advertising activities, advertisers, advertising agents and advertisement publishers should not engage
in any form of unfair competition.").
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at a predatory price and the basis to penalize the enterprises concerned.' 5 As Professor
Wang Xiaoye of the Chinese Academy of Social Science pointed out, this practice of judging the trade price of private autonomy by the state authority with its arbitrary power
6
illustrates the remains of the old ideology of the planned economy.'
Even the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the state authority
responsible for the market administration, openly admitted for a long time the existence of
serious problems concerning market competition, including a lack of a specific legislation
and definitions applicable to monopolistic practices, weak control on administrative monopolies, the state monopoly in public utilities sectors, a lack of professional service and
support, ineffective enforcement and penalties, and overlapping government authorities in
7
regulating the market.'
Despite the pressing challenges to the healthy development of the market economy, the
introduction of an antimonopoly law into China was very controversial. From the very
beginning, the law's enactment was opposed by some scholars on the ground that such
legislation would be unnecessary and unworkable, as the proposed law was "riddled with
uncertainties and anomalies."S Such opposition was echoed by some government officials
who claimed that current market conditions in China were still too young to legislate. 19
Although the debate was open and frank, much of the opposition was associated with the
ideology and the mentality of the government to maintain its strong position and influence on the market. Even long after the start of the legislative process, some scholars still
questioned the seriousness of the government's commitment. Several pointed out that the
real test for the government in the antimonopoly enactment was whether it would give up
its monopolistic restriction on market access; otherwise, promulgation of the law would
20
not help to improve market conditions.
Another interesting aspect that reflects the government's commitment to the introduction of an antimonopoly law into China is its willingness to make serious reference to
foreign experience, and to take advice from, and cooperate with foreign governments and
international organizations. In the course of drafting, the Chinese government held several international conferences on the antimonopoly legislation supported by foreign gov15. Anti-Dumping & Countervailing Rules, (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 25, 1997, effective
Mar. 25, 1997) arts. 8, 10, & 12 LAWINFOCIJINA (last visited Aug. 28, 2009) (P.R.C.).
16. Adam Charles Ritter, China NearFinalizingAnti-Monopoly Law, CHINA NEWSLE-FIER, July 2006, http:/
/www.hklaw.com/id24660/PublicationId 1636/Recumld3 l/contentid47523/.
17. Wang Xiaoye, Fan long duanfa dui kui guo gong si xian zhijong zheng xing wei de guan zbi [Regulating
Conducts to Restrict Competition by Multinationals under Antimonopoly Law], in JING JI QUAN QIU HUA XIAJING
ZHENG FA DE XIN FA ZHAN [NEW DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAW UNDER GLOBALIZATION] 248
(2005); see also Wang Xuezheng, Contribution from China 3-5, OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON COMPETITION

CCNM/GF/COMP/WC (2001) 10, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/61/2491690.pdf; Bruce M.
Owen et al., China'sCompetition Policy Reforms: The Antimonopoly Law & Beyond 33-39 (OohnM. Olin Program

in Law & Econ. of Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No. 339, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=978810.
18. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 162.
19. Id.
20. David Tang & Bill Zhang, China: The PRC's New Antimonopoly Law Has A Long Way to Go, MONDAQ,
Nov. 14, 2007, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asparticleid=54318; Xu Guangyao, Xing zheng long duan de
fan lang dian gui zhi [The Anti-Monopoly Law's Regulation of Administrative Policy], 6 CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE
123 (2004).
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ernments with the participation of international experts. 21 China participated in the
OECD Global Forum on Competition as early as 2001 with some frank submissions. 22 A
couple of drafts of the law were passed to foreign countries and professional associations
for comments. For example, the government branches of the European Union and Japan,
and the three sections of the American Bar Association all submitted their detailed com23
ments on, and proposals for the drafts of the legislation.

II.

The Antimonopoly Law of 2007

The final version of the AML includes eight chapters and fifty-seven articles. At the
beginning, the legislative purposes are stated: "preventing and curbing monopolistic conducts, protecting fair market competition, enhancing economic efficiency, maintaining the
consumer interests and the public interests, and promoting healthy development of the
socialist market economy" in China. 24 As such, the AML apparently is loaded with several, possibly even competing, goals.
On its surface, the AML does not provide any clear definition of "monopolistic conduct," but rather sets out three categories of such conduct: (1)any monopoly agreement
among undertakings; (2) abuse of the dominant market positions by undertakings; and (3)
concentration of undertakings that may eliminate or restrict competition. 25 According to
Article 12 of the AML, "undertakings" refer to legal persons, other organizations, or natural individuals that engage in commodities and services trades. 26 The narrow definition
seems to indicate the government's unwillingness to directly subject state entities and the
monopolized businesses under its control to the jurisdiction of the AML.27
In the 2005 draft of the AML, abuse of administrative power by government agencies
and their subordinate departments that would eliminate or restrict competition was listed
as a form of monopolistic conduct. 28 In the final version of the AML however, an admin21. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 175; see William Blumenthal, Presentation to the International Symposium
on the Draft Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, (May 23-24, 2005) (transcript available
at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/blumenthal/20050523SCLAOFinal.pdo;

MEM.IORANDUM FROM EU-CHiNA

(Apr.22, 2005), available at http://www.euchinawto.org/index.php?option=
corn docman&task=docdownload&gid=94.
22. Xue Zheng Wang, The Relationship Between Competition Authorities & Sectoral Regulators, OECD
CONFERENCE ON COMPETITION

GLOBAL FORUM ON COMPETITION DAF/COMP/GF/WD, (2005) 13, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/

49/21/34284999.pdf; Xue Zheng Wang, Challenges/Obstales Faced by Competition Authorities in Achieving
GreaterEconomic Development Through the Promotion of Competition, OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON COMPETITION CCNM/GF/COMP/WC (2004) 16, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/51/23727203.pdf.
23. John Yong Ren & Ning Yang, The Imminent Release of China'sAnti-Monopoly Law-What to Expect,
CHINA L. & PRIAc., Sept. 2005, at 26; Adam F. Bobrow et al.,Joint Submission of the ABA's Sections ofAntitrnist
Law, in

IN-TIELLFCTUAL

PROP. LAW

&

INT'L LAW ON THE PROPOSED ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW OF THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, (2005), http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/business-regulation/anti-

trust/chinacommentsantimonopoly.pdf.
24. Anti-monopoly Law, supra note 4, art. 1.
25. Id. art. 3.

26. Id. ch.1, art.12.
27. See The Competition Act, No. 12 of 2003, India Code (2003), s.2(h), available at http:I/indiacode.nic.in/ (discussing that in India, any department of the government, which is or has been engaged in
any business activity, investment or other undertaking is subject to the uniform governance of the Act).
28. See David Huang & David Richardson, China's Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law (June 24, 2005), http://
www.dorsey.com/Resources/Detail.aspx?pub=bdd82a88-75ab-4aa3-bca8-5e4a5cOe4978.
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istrative monopoly characterized by an abuse of government powers was deleted from the
list. Instead, a vague statement was added to the general principles that administrative
29
agencies shall not abuse their powers to eliminate or restrict competition of the market.
Thus, on the one hand, abuse of government powers by administrative agencies may not
be considered monopolistic conduct as such. 30 Article 4 of the AML explicitly stipulates
that the government shall formulate and implement competition rules suitable to the socialist market economy of China. 31 Moreover, the AML allows the government to protect
the undertakings of state monopolized businesses because of their strategic importance to
national economic lifelines and national security, although protection of consumers' interests is also generally mentioned. 32 In explaining such a provision, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has made it clear that the special feature of the so-called socialist
market economy in relation to the antimonopoly regime lies in the leading position of the
public ownership. 33 Thus market efficiency, as a crucial antimonopoly goal, may only be
34
achieved in line with the public ownership principle.
On the other hand, the AML does attempt a different approach in dealing with administrative monopoly with some separate rules. Chapter 5 of the AML sets out some more
detailed rules that prohibit abuse of administrative powers, including forced purchase, regional blockage, discriminating standards, forced restriction on competition, and eliminating or restricting competition by enactments in violation of the national laws and
regulations. 35 With regard to this approach, some in the legislative branch are of the view
that, given the current political and market conditions, one can hardly expect the AML to
fundamentally solve the problem of administrative monopoly. But as the specific legislation in this regard, the AML must include some rules to reflect the position of the state
and prevent such conduct in the market. 36 A careful reading will further show that the
current AML subjects only administrative monopoly with trade of goods to its jurisdic37
tion, leaving all the government monopolistic schemes with services trade untouched.
Any agreement to eliminate or restrict competition among undertakings is prohibited.
Article 13 of the AML prohibits such agreements between market competitors, including
those to fix or change the price of products; to limit the output or sales of the products; to
separate the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets; to limit the purchase of
new technology or new facilities, or the development of new products or new technology;
to jointly boycott transactions; or other kinds of monopoly agreements identified by state
enforcement agencies. 38 Moreover, undertakings are banned to enter into monopoly
29. Anti-monopoly Law, supranote 4, art. 8.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. ch.i, art.4
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 8.

SHANG MING & YANLING YIN, "ZHONGIIUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FAN LONG DUAN FA" LI JIE Yu
SHI YONG [Arr'i-,lONOPOLY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: INTERPRETATIONS AND APPLICATION], DI 1 BAN. BEIJING SHI: FA LO CHU BAN SHE 16 (2007).
35. See Anti-monopoly Law, supra note 4, arts. 32-37.
36. ZIIONGIIUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FAN LONG IUAN FA TIAO WEN SHUO MING, LI FA LI YOUJI XIANG
GUAN GUI DING. BEIJING Sill: BEIJING DA XUE CHU BAN SIE, 37 (2007).

37. Anti-monopoly Law, supra note 4, ch. 5, art. 33.
38. Id. art. 13.
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agreements with their trading partners for transferring goods to third-parties at a fixed
price or fixing the floor price of such transfers. 39
Like the legislation in other jurisdictions, the prohibition is subject to some important
exceptions such as agreements to develop new products, agreements for quality upgrading,
efficiency improvement or standardization, agreements to improve competitiveness of
small enterprises, agreements to deal with economic depression, or other agreements of
this kind. 4° Certain exceptions, however, may not be familiar to some other market economies. For instance, Article 15 exempts agreements to safeguard lawful interests of undertakings in foreign trade and economic cooperation. 41 Such undefined interests may not
only create different treatment of domestic firms on the domestic market (depending on
whether they can link their otherwise unlawful agreements with export to the international market), but also lead to potential conflict of laws by allowing domestic undertakings to use such prohibitive agreements in China with impacts on the international
market. According to the MOFCOM, such agreements among domestic undertakings are
needed to deal with cut-throat competition on exporting prices, and the antidumping in42
vestigations in foreign countries against Chinese goods.
Abuse of dominant market position is another focus of the legislation. Article 17 of the
AML defines "dominant market position" as the status of undertakings to control the
price, quantity, or other trading conditions of relevant products to eliminate or affect
competition within the relevant market. 43 According to the AML, such a position can be
established by proof of certain key factors, such as market share and status of the undertakings concerned, as well as the relevant market conditions. 4 A dominant market position may be assumed if a single undertaking's market share accounts for one half or more,
or two undertakings that jointly account for two-thirds market share or more, or three
undertakings that jointly account for three-quarters market share or more, of the relevant
market. Inthese calculations, undertakings with a market share of less than one-tenth are
excluded. 45 Once a market-dominant position is established, abuse of such a position will
be found through trading at a monopolistic high price, predatory pricing, discriminatory
treatment, refusal to deal, exclusive or forced transactions, tie-in schemes, or refusal of
access to network. 46
The AML also sets out rules governing market concentration, which arises in mergers
of undertakings, obtaining control of other undertakings by way of acquisition of shares or
assets, or by contract.4 7 A concentration that meets the statutory threshold shall not be
carried out, unless notification is made to the state anti-monopoly authority. 48 In this

regard, the State Council promulgated the Provisions on Notification Thresholds for
Concentration of Undertakings on August 3, 2008, as the first detailed regulation adopted
to implement the Antimonopoly Law (Concentration Provisions). According to the Con39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. art. 14.
Id. art. 15.
Id.
MING & YIN, supra note 34, at 86.
Anti-monopoly Law, supra note 4, ch. 3, art. 17.
Id. art. 18.
Id. art. 19.
Id. art. 17.
Id. art. 20.
Id. art. 21.
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centration Provisions, notification must be filed before any concentration can be carried
out if either of the following thresholds is met: (1) the worldwide turnover of all the
parties to the proposed concentration in the last accounting year exceeds RMB ten billion
and turnover of any two participating undertakings within China exceeds RMB 400 million in the last accounting year; or (2) the turnover of all the parties to the proposed
concentration within China in the last accounting year exceeds RMB two billion and turnover of any two participating undertakings within China exceeds RMB 400 million in the
last accounting year.49 The state authorities, however, may initiate an anti-monopoly investigation into certain market concentrations that do not meet the filing thresholds if it
can be proved that the concentrations have, or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition on the market.5 0 Although the revenue-based test provides some
important and detailed guidelines for foreign mergers and acquisition in China, further
clarity on both substantive and procedural standards is still urgently needed. 51
The decision of the preliminary examination of the antimonopoly authority on a proposed concentration shall be adopted within thirty days of receipt of all the required documents. 52 But the proposed concentration may be implemented on the basis of no
objection if the state authority decides not to further scrutinize the case or fails to make its
decision within the statutory period. 53 If the antimonopoly authority decides that it is
necessary to further examine the proposed concentration, it shall inform the parties concerned and carry out the investigation within ninety days of the decision. 54 In special
circumstances, the examination period may be further extended by up to sixty days.SS The
major considerations for government scrutiny include the control and concentration of
the undertakings concerned in the market, possible impacts on market access, consumers,
technological innovations, national economic development, and other factors concerned
with the antimonopoly enforcement agencies.

56

The state antimonopoly authority may

nevertheless allow certain concentrations after balancing the positive and negative factors
of proposed transactions, or on public interest considerations, although no detail is pro57

vided yet in this regard.

According to the Law, the Antimonopoly Commission of the PRC is established as the
state authority under the State Council in charge of rule and policy-making and the coordination of implementation.5 8 But in terms of enforcement of the AML, the powers are
divided. Different state agencies enjoy their own powers in carrying out investigations,
49. See Notification Thresholds Regulations (promulgated by the State Council, Aug. 3, 2008, effective
Aug. 3, 2008), art. 3, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2008-08/04/content1063769.htm.
50. Anti-monopoly Law, srtpra note 4, art. 4.
51. See Hannah Ha & Gerry O'Brien, Update on China's Anti-Monopoly Law- Final Merger Filing
Thresholds Introduced, (Aug. 7, 2008), http://laywers.martindale.com/international-law/article-JSM-MayerBrown-JSM 490080.htm.; Michael M. Hickman, et al., New Rules Proposed For Chinese Merger Control,
(April 4, 2008), http://laywers.martindale.com/legal-management/article Fried-Frank-Harris-Shriver-Jacobson-LLP_414798.htrm.
52. Anti-monopoly Law, supra note 4, ch.4, art. 25.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. id.
56. See id. art. 27.
57. See id. art. 28.
58. See id. art. 9.

VOL. 43, NO. 4

ANTI-MONOPOLY LEGAL REGIME

1477

taking enforcement measures and entrusting the functions to their local branches. 59 As a
result, the limited authority of the national Antimonopoly Commission would render the
entire legal regime defective in lack of uniformity.
The AIML has three types of legal liabilities for violations: criminal liability, administrative penalties, and civil compensation to the victims concerned. 60 If an interested party to
the agreement disagrees with the decision of the antimonopoly authority, the People's
Court may conduct its judicial review upon the party's petition as the legal remedy.61 It
should be noted, however, that the penalties under the AML are much more lenient than
those of earlier drafts. For example, the maximum fine has been reduced to RMB 1 million from RMB 10 million in the 2005 Draft and RMB 5 million in the 2006 Draft. Civil
compensation of up to twice the actual loss suffered by the victim that was included in the
2005 Draft has been deleted.
Since the adoption of the AMIL, a series of detailed implcmcnting rules has been
promulgated. In addition to the Concentration Provisions of the State Council, other
regulations adopted by lower-ranking authorities include the Provisions on the Guideline
for Defining the Relevant Market,6 2 the Thresholds for Prior Notification of Concentration of Undertakings,6 3 and the Procedural Provisions to Deal with Cases of Monopoly
Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Market Position. 64 In the same period, some draft
provisions were circulated for public comments, and thus more detailed regulations to
65
implement the AML are expected to be adopted soon.

HI.

Continuing debates and controversies

The adoption of the AML has apparently failed to end the debates and controversies.
In addition to many technical concerns, the two most controversial issues on the way to
establish an antimonopoly framework in China are how to form an effective and unified
59. See id. arts. 10, 38 & 39.
60. See id. ch. 7.
61. See id. art. 53.
62. Guide of the Antimonopoly Comm. of the State Council for the Definition of the Relevant Market
(promulgated by the Anti-monopoly Auth. under the State Council, May 24, 2009, effective May 24, 2009)
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Aug. 24, 2009) (P.R.C.); Andrew Batson, China's Anti-trust Rules Will Carry a
Limited Scope, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2008, at A8. For a recent comment, see Andrew Batson, China Rules Set
Limited Reach over Mergers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2008, available at http://chinese.wsj.com/big5/20080805/
bch 100127.asp?source=article.
63. Regulation on Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings (promulgated by the Antimonopoly Authority under the State Council, May 24, 2009, effective May 24, 2009) (P.R.C.).
64. The Procedural Provisions to Deal with Cases of Monopoly Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Market Position (promulgated by the Anti-monopoly Auth. under the State Council, June 5, 2009, effective July
1, 2009) (P.R.C.).
65. Thus far, the draft provisions that have been circulated by the MOFCOM for public comments include
Draft Interim Provisions Concerning Notification for Concentration of Undertakings, Draft Interim Provisions Concerning Examination of Concentration of Undertakings, Draft Interim Provisions Concerning Evidence Taking for Undertaking Concentration below the Notification Threshold with Monopoly Suspicion,
Draft Interim Provisions Concerning Investigation and Handling of Undertaking Concentration below the
Notification Threshold with Monopoly Suspicion, and Draft Interim Provisions Concerning Investigation
and Handling of Concentration of Undertakings without Notification in Accordance with the Law, which
were made public by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China Anti-Monopoly Bureau, at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfb.html (last visited July 5, 2009).
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antimonopoly framework within the government structure and how to develop a consistent legal regime equally applicable to monopolistic conducts of all market players.
For a long time, different state agencies have claimed jurisdiction over competitionrelated matters. Among them, the SAIC and the MOFCOM are the two major bidders in
the power struggle. The State Commission of National Development and Reform
(SCNDR) and the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
(SASAC) also have some authority on nationwide price control and maintaining the leading position of the state sector on the market, respectively. Although both the SAIC and
the MOFCOM agreed that the antimonopoly authority should be formed under the State
Council, both of them have been trying to reserve more powers in the regime to be established. The MOFCOM established its Antimonopoly Office in 2004, which is responsible
"for upsetting market monopoly and regional blockage, preventing monopolistic activities,
and promoting the establishment of a unified, open, competitive, and orderly market system." 66 At the same time, the SAIC claimed that as a ministerial unit directly under the
State Council, its duties included, inter alia, supervising market competition and dealing
with violations, such as monopoly and unfair competition. 67 In particular, it currently has
a well-developed supervision network with 70,000 enforcement officers on the front line
of the market, and thus, should be more capable than other state authorities of performing
68
the regulatory duties.
In the new round of streamlined government departments with redefined structures and
functions,69 the MOFCOM seems to be getting the upper hand in the power struggle over
the SAIC. According to the State Council's recent approval, its Market Order Bureau has
been retained and the Antimonopoly Office has been upgraded to the Antimonopoly Bureau, with the responsibility to play a leading role in regulating and maintaining good
market order while carrying out an anti-monopoly examination on market concentration
as well as dealing with overseas antimonopoly activities. 70 The SAIC on the other hand is
permitted to establish the Enforcement Bureau of Antimonopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition with the responsibility to implement the AML through investigation and enforcement powers on the market. 71 The SCNDR is also given the power to formulate and
66. See Zhongguo Xinwen Wang, The Ministry of Commerce Established an Anti-monopoly Investigation Work
Undertaken by the Office Anti-monopoly Legislation, CINA NEws NET, Sept. 17, 2004, available at http://
www.cns.hk:89/news/2004/2004-09-17/26/484912.shtml.
67. Mission, State Administration for Industry & Commerce (SAIC) of the P.R.C., http://www.saic.gov.cn/
english/aboutus/Mission/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2009).
68. Sheng Jiemin, Address at the 7th Annual Conference of Peking University-Hong Kong University
Legal Research Centre (Dec. 21, 2005); see also Mr. Zhou Bohua, Address at the 2007 International Symposium on Antimonopoly Law Enforcement, in GONGSHANG XINGZHFNG UOURNAL OF STATE ADMINISTRATION AND.COMMERCE], Nov. 2, 2008, at 6-7.

69. See China to Test Run Super-ministries in Central Government Reform, XINiUA NEWS, MAR. 5, 2008,
http://www.chinadaily.net/china/2008npc/2008-03/05/content-6510152.hun.
70. The approval of the State Council was dated August 23, 2008. See State Administration for Industry &
Commerce (SAIC) of the P.R.C., The Ministry of Commerce of the State Council Formally Approved the New
"Three Fixed" Scheme, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, Aug. 23, 2008, http://bigS.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/
gzdt/2008-08/23/content_1077586.htm.
71. The approval of the State Council to the SAIC was dated July 11, 2008. See The State Council on the
Issuance of SAIC Main Responsibilities of their Internal Structure and Staffing Requirements of the Notice,
State Administration for Industry & Commerce (SAIC) of the P.R.C., (promulgated by the Anti-Monopoly
Authority under the State Council, July 11, 2009, effective July 11, 2009) (P.R.C).
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adjust the prices of the commodities and services under state control, and deal with price
72
violation and monopolistic conducts.
The AML tries to compromise the power struggle by allowing the regulatory and enforcement authority to be shared by different state departments. This approach, however,
is strongly opposed by virtually all of the experts involved in the legislation. According to
Professor Wang Xiaoye: "No country in the world appoints so many administrative departments to enforce a law and to protect market competition. Without a unified and
authoritative law enforcement organ, it will be difficult to effectively enforce the An73
timonopoly Law."
As such, the two-tier, three-pronged structure with separate enforcement powers for
different state agencies was identified as a major defect of the AML immediately after its
adoption. In fact, the final version of the AML retreated from the design of the 2006
Draft to create a unified enforcement system, and as a result, the current regime may
inevitably suffer from conflicts, unpredictability, and lack of independence in the frag74
mented implementation.
According to the AML, the national Antimonopoly Commission was established on July
28, 2008, with Vice Premier Wang Qishan as the Director. The top leaders of the
MOFCOM, the SAIC and the SCNDR have been appointed deputy directors and the
fourteen members of the Commission are representatives of different state ministries and
agencies. 75 It was further reported that according to the working procedures approved by
the State Council, the main duties of the Commission shall be carried out through meetings to formulate competition policy, coordinate investigation and enforcement, and
adopt antimonopoly guidelines. As such, the Commission shall not engage in any con76
crete enforcement, which will be left to the MOFCOM, the SAIC and the SCNDR.
Under this arrangement, the independence and impartiality of the Antimonopoly Commission may hardly be guaranteed because it is clearly subject to the administrative personnel and budgetary control of the Central Government. James Rose, Asia-Pacific
Editor of Ethical Corporation, considers such structure a sign that the "de-politicising"
77
antimonopoly efforts are curtailed to serve the so-called socialist market economy.
72. The approval of the State Council was dated August 21, 2008. See National Development and Reform
Commission, State Administration for Industry & Commerce (SAIC) of the P.R.C. (promulgated by the
Anti-monopoly Auth. under the State Council, Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/t20080822-23
1895.hoin (last visited August 27, 2009) (P.R.C.).
73. Liu Li, Anti-monopoly Draft Provokes Debate, C111NADAILY, Nov. 15, 2006, http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-11/15/content-733279.htm.
74. Xinzhu Zhang & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, The Antimonopoly Law in China: Where Do We Stand?. 3 COMPErrrON POL'Y INT'L, 195-97 (2007); Andrew Baton & Jason Leow, Beijing's Antitrust Plan Raises Questions,
WALL Si. J., Aug. 30, 2007, at A6; A. Ji, Fan Longduan Lifa Beihou De Zbanzheng [The War Behind the Antimonopoly Law Legislation], 11 FAZrn Yu SHEHuI [RULE OF LAW AND TiiE SOCIETY] (2007), at 12-13.
75. Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Guowuyuan Fanlongduan Weiyuanhui Zhuyao Zhize He Zucheng
Renyuan De Tongzhi [The State Council on the State Department Anti-Monopoly Committee's Main Responsibilities and Composition of the Notice], State Administration for Industry & Commerce (SAIC) of the
P.R.C., http://www.competitionlaw.cn/show.aspx?id=4487&cid=32 (last visited Aug. 27, 2009).
76. See State Council Approved the Anti-monopoly Committee's Work in an Orderly Fashion the Work of Antimonopoly Rules, XINi-uA NEws AGENCY, Sept. 13, 2008, http://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/1027/8015028.
html.
77. James Rose, Monopolising Anti-Monopoly Law in China, ETInCAL CORP., Nov. 22, 2004, http://
www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=3227.
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Moreover, assignment of the antimonopoly function to government branches against, inter alia, administrative monopoly, would lead to potential conflict of interests and the
weakening of their authority. As such, the current design may not be able to allow all of
the agencies to carry out their duties effectively.78 In fact, some members of the Antimonopoly Commission sitting with the MOFCOM and the SAIC on equal footing are
representatives of the state monopolized sectors, such as telecommunication, transportation, and electricity supply. 79 According to a report of the SAIC, between 1993-2006,
over 5,600 monopoly cases were dealt with; among them administrative monopoly
counted for only 519, a surprisingly small percentage in the environment of a strong,
government-led economy. The reason provided is not that there were not many such
violations, but that the SAIC was not able to effectively deal with these kinds of cases.80
Another serious test to the effectiveness of the AML in China, which is also related to
the three way split of enforcement authority, is whether the legislation will ensure a fair,
level playing field to deal with both domestic administrative and foreign monopolies in the
market. On the one hand, the strong position of the government and abuse of administrative monopoly in the market has been considered "pernicious,"s' including local and
sectoral monopolistic conduct under government protection through restrictive means,
such as administrative approval, discriminative enactments, technical barriers, and exces82
sive fee charge.
In 2005, before the Draft AML was submitted to the national legislature for deliberation, the SASAC made an open and high-profile statement that in the transitional period
the state authority ought to be more involved in development of state-owned enterprises
in order to prevent any shaking-up of the leading position of public ownership in China.
Mr. Li Rong-Rong, the Director General of the Commission, even warned that irresponsible withdrawal of the public economy from the market would not only deny the state
sector the ability to play its major role, but would also cause more trouble for the national
economy.S3 In the legislative process, such political wrestling was well-reflected in the
complete deletion of thc section addressing administrative monopoly from the drafts a
84
couple of times.
Directly before the adoption of the AML, the central government made it clear through
an administrative circular that the state would maintain "absolute control" in seven business sectors, including the military industry, power, oil and coal supply, telecommunication, civil aviation, and other transportation means. In other industries, such as
78. Owen et al., supra note 17; Andrew Batson, China Draws Criticism on New Antimonopoly Law, WALL ST.
J., July 23, 2008, available at http://chinese.wsj.com/big5/20080723/chwl52619.asp?source=article.
79. Wang Jianping, Gaming of the Interest Groups under Administrative Monopoly, Fanxingzhengxing
Longduan Yo Cujin Jingzheng Zhengce Quianyan Weni Yanju [A Study of Pressing Issues on Anti-Administrative Monopoly and Policy to Promote Competition], ECON. ScI. PREzSS
OF CHINA 78-87 (2008).
80. Report of Hong Kong, COMMERCIAL DAILY, Jan. 12, 2006, http://www.fayhoo.com/servlet/info.infolanmuxx?lmid=20100104&id=20060112:1515128.
81. WILLIAMS, spra note 6, at 139-40; see alsoJaredA. Berry, Anti-Monopoly Law in China A Socialist Market
Economy Wrestles with its Antitrtst Regime, 2 IN -'L L. & MAN. REv. 129, 138-139 (2005).
82. Peter Wang & Stephen G. Harris, China: The China Anti-Monopoly Law Becomes Effective, MONDAQ,
Aug. 26 2008, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=65184&login=true&nogo=l.
83. See Report of Li Rongrong Speech, Chairman of SASAC, SHANGHAI SEc. NEWS, Jan. 21, 2005, http://
finance.qianlong.com/26/2005/01/21/206@24831 10.htn.
84. See Report of Hong Kong, supra note 80; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 158-59.
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equipment manufacturing, the auto industry, electronic information, construction, iron
and steel production, nonferrous metals, the chemical industry, exploration and design,
and science and technology, the state would keep "relatively strong control." 5s Although
the AML finally included some general provisions dealing with administrative monopolistic conducts, 86 the lack of enforcement details and the unclear exemptions granted by
Article 7 have disappointed scholars, practitioners, and private entrepreneurs, and have
s7
raised further concerns on social justice, fairness, and market efficiency.
Such a state policy has triggered deep concerns with consumer protection, 0 fair participation of private sectors, rent seeking and corruption, market efficiency, and further political and economic reform in China. There are many studies in China to reflect such
situations that record the public cries of discontent with such monopolistic conduct and
exorbitant profits.8 9 The government, however, has shown no intention of changing the
current market condition, and cvcn dcnics thc cxistcncc of such govcrnmcnt-controllcd
monopolies. 90 In fact, according to state statistics, the domination of the state sector in
the national economy has reached its peak in recent years since the SOE reform in the late
1970s, and the trend has been accelerated under the "national champion" strategy after
China's WTO accession. 9 1 Between 1998 and 2006, the number of SOEs and state controlled companies was reduced from 64,700 to 26,100, or by fifty-nine percent. However,
their total assets increased by seventy-eight percent to RIB 13.4 trillion. By 2007,
through seventy-seven rounds of government arranged reorganization, the number of
large companies directly under central government control was down further from 196 to
151, but their contribution to the national economy reached forty-four percent of China's
GDP.92 According to the latest plan, the state sector concentration will be further enhanced by reducing the number of enterprises directly controlled by the central government from 151 to between eighty and 100 by 2010, and establishing thirty to fifty supersized companies with international competitiveness. 93 In this regard, some experts have
85. Zheng Jian Fa, Guiding Opinions of the CSRC, SASAC, MOF, PBC, and the MOFCOM on Share-Trading
Reform of Listed Companies, AsiANLH, Aug. 23, 2005, http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/
gootcsmpatmosrolc823/.
86. See Anti-monopoly Law, supra note 4, art. 8, ch. 5.
87. See Huang Yong, Pursuing the Second Best: the History, Monentum, and Remaining Issues of China'sAntiMonopoly Law, 75 AN-TI'RUSi L.J. 117 (2008).
88. See Grace Li & Angus Young, Competition Laws and Policies in China and Hong Kong: A Tale of Two
RegulatoiyJourneys, 7 J. INT'L TRADE L. & POL'Y 186 (2008) (noting that the AML does not have a clear
focus on the protection of consumer welfare).
89. See Bruce M. Owen et al., Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility, 1 J. COMPETHON
L. & ECON. 123, 123-48 (2005), http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/l/l/123.
90. See Guoziwei Fuzhuren Cheng Dianxinye Bucanzai Longduanjuzuojiejing [The Denial of the Telecommunication Monopoly by the Deputy Director of the SASAC Shocks the Public], NANFANG ZiHOUMO [SouTHERN WEEKENO], Mar. 14, 2008.

91. See Chao Xi, Transforming Chinese Enterprises: Ideology, Efficienty, and Instrumentalism in the Process of
Reform, in ASIAN SOCIALISM AND LEGAL CHANGE: THE DYNAMICS OF VIETNAMFSE RENEWAL AND CHINESE REFORM, 91-110 (ohn Gillespie & Pip Nicholson eds., 2005).
92. See Gao i & Ren Baoping, Zhongguo 30 Nian De Qiye Gaige: Huigu Yu Fazhan Zhanwang [30 Years of
Enterprise Reform in China: Review and Prospect], 1 GUIZHOU CAIJING XUEYUAN XUEBAO U. OF FIN. C. oF
GUIZHoul 45 (2009); see also 2007 Total Sales of Central Enterprises to 9.84 Trillion Yuan, JINGUHA SHIBAO
[BEIJING TIMES], Mar. 5, 2008, http://business.sohu.com/20080305/n255532126.shtml.
93. Mr. Li Rongrong, the Director of State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
(SASAC), Address at a Central Work Conference on Corporate Executives (Dec. 16, 2008), transcript availa-
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concluded that "the monopolistic interests of SOEs have always been sophistically preserved by various government departments using commercial and national reasons. In
turn, this creates poor services and uncompetitive rates for consumers. A futile regulation
94
like Chapter 5 would only be nominal and symbolic at best."
On the other hand, the aggressive expansion of foreign investment in China gave rise to
sensitive questions concerning the degree of equal application of the anti-monopoly rules
to foreign investors. Although the business environment in China is quite different from
that in other jurisdictions because of the level of government control in China, foreign
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have been a dynamic means of foreign investment since
the 1990s. The wave of foreign M&As in China has gained more momentum from accelerated marketization, the further opening of markets, and the improving legal conditions
under China's WTO obligations and commitments. In fact, M&As in China were at an
all-time high in 2008, with US$159.6 billion worth of deals recorded - forty-four percent
more than 2007. The inbound M&As posted a 34.2 percent increase as compared with
95
2007, making China a global investment haven despite the global financial meltdown.
According to some legal experts, conditions seem ripe in China for significant growth in
M&A activities, and the investment landscape in China, together with innovative transaction structures and legal framework can be expected to expand to new horizons.96
In dealing with the wave of foreign M&As after China's accession to the WTO, some
state authorities jointly issued the Interim Provisions on Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors in 2003 (2003 Provisions). In addition to the requirement for
compliance with state industrial and investment policy, the 2003 Provisions subjected foreign investors to compulsory notification to the MOFCOM and the SAIC for anti-mo97
nopoly clearance before the transactions could proceed.
In May 2004, the SAIC published an investigative report entitled, "Multinationals' Activities to Restrict Competition in China and the Counter-Measures to support the acceleration of the anti-monopoly legislation." According to the report, some multinationals
have obtained their dominant market position in China with monopolistic tendencies in
several business sectors. Large multinationals such as Eastman Kodak, Microsoft, and
Tetra Pak were named in the SAIC's investigation and its accusation list. Other unnamed
transnational companies were also found to have built up dominant positions in China
through their technological, capital, and managerial advantages. According to the report,

ble at http://www.sinofile.net/clients/amcweb.nsf/amcA/2CB8A2B55B7C3 3A482 5 7522001 D0BDA?open

document.
94. Li & Young, supra note 88.
95. See ChinaAll Alone in Asian M&A Growth, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 6, 2009, http://ww-w.chinadaily.com.cn/
bizchina/2009-01/06/content_7368947.htm.
96. Shane Knowler & Raymond Yung, Asia Banking Insights: Tackling the Key Issues in Banking and Capital
Markets in Asia, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, Oct. 2007, http://www.pwc.com/en-SG/sg/financial-services/
assets/publication-asia-banking-insights-200710.pdf.; Xian Chu Zhang, New Landscape ofForeign Mergers and
Acquisitions in China after Its WTO Accession, 6 J. CHINESE AND CoMp. L. 229, 229-55 (2003).

97. Interim Provisions on Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (jointly issued by
MOFCOM & SAIC Mar. 7, 2003, effective Apr. 8, 2003) arts. 19 & 20.
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the multinationals' aggressive expansion constituted a threat to the safety of the national
economy. 98
The MOFCOM, however, disagreed with this radical position. In a research paper, the
Research Institute of the MOFCOM argued that foreign investments that had made an
important contribution to China's economic development had neither threatened the economic safety of China, nor controlled the technology market or any sensitive business
sector. 99 Mr. Shang Ming, as the Head of the Treaty and Law Department and the Director of the Antimonopoly Office of the MOFCOM, then further pointed out that the antimonopoly law should be equally applied to both domestic and foreign enterprises.1 00 The
anti-monopoly enactment should aim to promote and safeguard fair competition in all
kinds of enterprises on the market while also preventing monopolistic activities. 0 1
The divergence escalated and led to further twists when the AML drafting entered the
final stage. In early 2006, in an interview Li Deshui, the then-Director General of the
National Bureau of Statistics warned that foreign "malicious [M&As in China] could
threaten [China's] 'economic security and national sovereignty,' "and called for action to
curb the trend of multinationals in China.' 2 On the contrary, Hu Jingyan, Director of
Foreign Investment Department of the MOFCOM then continued openly to refute the
proposition against the expansion of foreign business in China.I03 He noted that foreign
funds make up less than three percent of the market share in industries that are key to the
nation's economic development, and added that foreign investment mainly focuses on
high-tech and machinery and electronics industries, which witnessed fasted growth in export.'04 As such, there was neither an emerging foreign monopoly in any region or busi105
ness sector, nor any foreign control of the economic lifeline in China.
Despite the disagreement, the Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors was jointly re-promulgated by the MOFCOM, the SAIC,
the SASAC, the State Taxation Bureau, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and
the State Foreign Exchange Administration in August 2006 as amendments to the 2003
Provisions (2006 Provisions).' 0 6 According to the 2006 Provisions, foreign M&As shall
98. Multinationals'Activities to Restrict Competition in Chinaand the Counter-Measuresto Support the Acceleration of the Anti-monopoly Legislation, 5 GONGSI IANG GUANLO [. STrATE ADMIN. OF INDUS. & COMM.], May,
2004, http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTTotal-GSXZ20040531 .html.
99. Thomas R. Howell et al., China'sNew Anti-Monopoly Law: A Perspective Front the United State: PACIFIC
R e L. & POL'Y J. 53 (2009), http://www.competitionlaw.cn/show.aspx?id=4804&cid=29.
100. Xinhua Wang Xiaobo, Shang: Antimonopoly Law Not Only for MultinationalCompanies, CINA NE-r
WORK, Dec. 23, 2004, http://expo20lO.china.com.cn/news/txt/2004-12/23/content 5736697.htm.
101. Interview with Shang, the Director of the Antimonopoly Office of MOFCOM (Dec. 23, 2004), in
ZHONGGUO WANG, [CIINA NET], http://expo20l0.china.com.cn/news/txt/2004-12/23/content 5736697.
htm.
102. More Dickie, Chinese Official Demands Curbs on 'Malicious' Buying by Multinationals,FIN. ExPRESS, Mar.
12, 2006, http://www.financialexpress-bd.com.
103. China Plans to Introduce Foreign Funds of $60 Bln, CHINA VIEW, Jan. 16, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english/2006-0 1/16/content_4058912.htm.
104. Id.
105. Xinhua News Agency Report (Jan. 17, 2006), http://www.sccwto.net:7000/wto/content.jsp?id=12385.
106. Guan yu wai guo tou zi zhe bing gou jing nei qi ye de gui ding [Provision on Mergers and Acquisitions
of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors] (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, State-Owned
Assets Supervision & Admin. Comm'n of the State Council, State Admin. of Taxation, State Admin. for
Indus. & Commerce, China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n & State Admin. of Foreign Exch., Aug. 8, 2006, effec-
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not be allowed to "create over-concentration, eliminate or hinder competition, or disturb
the social and economic order or harm the societal public interests, or lead to the loss of
state-owned assets."'1 07 For this purpose, a compulsory notification procedure was created
for foreign M&As that would lead to de facto control in key industries, and could affect
the national economic safety or transfer control over well-known trademarks or enterprises of China.' 0 8 Moreover, Chapter 5 of the 2006 Provisions mandated notification of
a foreign M&A to the MOFCOM and the SAIC with the separate and low thresholds. 109
Although the 2006 Provisions were not considered sophisticated enough," 0 they were
once criticized for their biased protection of domestic enterprises."'
As a positive development to build up a uniform antimonopoly regime in China, the
MOFCOM recently further amended the 2006 Provisions with immediate effectiveness
(2009 Provisions).112 The unilateral revision of the 2006 Provisions that were jointly
promulgated by six state authorities seems to indicate the exclusive jurisdiction of the
MOFCOM on foreign M&As in the new enforcement structure. 1 3 More importantly,
the 2009 Provisions completely delete Chapter 5 of the 2006 Provisions, and subject notifications of foreign M&As to the Concentration Provisions of the State Council." 4 As
such, on the one hand, some special foreign M&A rules are being merged into the newly
established anti-monopoly regime. On the other hand, the 2009 Provisions, as a separate
set of rules governing foreign M&As are still retained where unclearly defined "public
interests," "the social and economic order," and "loss of state assets" will continue to be
5
the concerns of foreign investors."
Multinational corporations, although having praised the government's continuing effort
to improve the legislation, do not hide their worries about the possible market barriers

tive
Sept. 8, 2006) 2007 STATE COUNCIL GAZ. 29-36 (P.R.C.), available at http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/
zcfb 200608/20060802839438.html.
107. Id. art. 3.
108. Id. art. 12.
109. According to art. 51 of the 2006 Provisions, a foreign M&A had to be subject to the notification
procedure if the foreign investor's annual sales in China exceeded RMB 150 million, the number of domestic
enterprises in the relevant business it has taken over within a year exceeded ten, the foreign party's market
share in China has reached twenty percent, or the proposed M&A would result in twenty-five percent market
share of the foreign party in China. Even these thresholds were not met, any competing domestic enterprise,
government departments or business associations may still petition to the MOFCOM and the SAIC to require the foreign party submit a report on the ground that the proposed M&A involves a huge market share,
or would seriously affect the market competition. See id. art. 5.
110. Emma Davies & Cheng Li Yow, China's Anti-trust
Regime, CHINA L. & PRAc., April 2005, at 24.
111. Wang, supra note 17, at 282.
112. The 2009 Provisions were issued on June 22, 2009.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Article 3 of the 2009 Provisions stipulates that foreign investors shall not cause over concentration,
restrict or eliminate competition, disturb the social and economic order and public social interests, and result
in loss of the state assets.
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created by the new AML and abuse of the procedures.'16 Some foreign investors have
7
further expressed their worries about M&A reviews on national security grounds."1
The differing views of the various state authorities and the trepidatious evolution inevitably led to uncertainty and unpredictability in practice. Some recent cases illustrate the
situation. The leading example in this regard is the government resistance to the proposed acquisition of eighty-five percent of shares of Xuzhou Construction Machinery
Group Co. (known as Xugong) for USD $375 million by Carlyle, which was the largest
private investment fund in the world in 2005, with the local government's support. 118
The proposed deal triggered a heated debate nationwide on the protection of key industries and safeguarding national economic security. But during the debate, the State Council issued the Several Opinions on Speeding up the Revitalization of Equipment
Manufacturing Industry on June 16, 2006, to the backdated effect of frustrating the deal

by designating the construction machinery industry as a key industry of the nation. 19 As
a result, any transfer of control of a large enterprise in this industry must involve consultation with relevant state authorities. 120 Issued shortly thereafter, the 2006 Provisions had
more emphasis on the protection of key industries and national economic security.12' In
this context, some experts have voiced concerns over the government's imposition of political pressure toward a specific foreign acquisition. 122 In July 2008, Carlyle reluctantly
gave up its acquisition plan after a three-year struggle, which included agreeing to reduce
123
its stake to forty-five percent.
Despite Carlyle's frustration, two French companies, SEB and Alston, successfully completed their acquisition deals with leading Chinese cookware maker Supor, and with Wuhan Boiler, a major power company, in 2007.124 In both cases, the foreign investors'

116. Junfeng Li, Foreign-invested Companies: More Risky Facing up to China'sAntimonopoly Law?, 51 IN."L. J.
L. & MGAIT. 179-86 (2009); Peter A. Neumann & Tony Zhang, China's New Foreign-fundedM&A Provisions:
GreaterLegal Protectionor Legalized Protectionism?, CHINA L. & PRAc., Oct. 2006, at 21-29. Recently, at least
three senior officials of the MOFCOM and the SAIC in charge of foreign acquisition approval were arrested
for the conspired corruption. See Senior SAIC Official Arrested, FIN. MAG., Oct. 28, 2008, http://english.caijing.com.cn/2008-10-28/110024002.html.
117. Keith Bradsher, Beijing Seeks New Security of Investment by Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2007, at Al.
118. Joe McDonald, China to Review Coca Cola Bid for Juice Maker, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 8, 2008, http://
abcnews.go.comlBusiness/wireStory?id=5750324; Jiang Yuxia, China Wants Funds From Foreign PrivateEquity
Firms, SHANGHAI DAILY, May 28, 2007, http://english.gov.cn/2007-O5/28/content_628129.htm.
119. Opinions on Speeding up the Revitalization of Equipment Manufacturing Industry, art. 7 (promulgated
by the State Council, June 16, 2006), available at http://gys.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/t20060626_74595.htm.
120. Id.
121. Id. art. 12.
122. See Statement of Mr. Zhang Hanya as the Deputy Chairman of the China Investment Association,
JINGUIIA SiBAO [BEIJING TIMES], June 30, 2006, http://business.sohu.com/20060630/n244017606.shtml.
123. Private Equity: Foreign Funds Face Beijing Blockade, ASIA MONEY, Sept. 1, 2008, http://www.asiamoney.
com/Article/2055617/SearchfResults/PRIVATE-EQUITY-Foreign-funds-face-Beijing-blockade.html?PartialFields=CATEGORY313 IDS%3A5923.
124. France SEB Completes Takeover of China's Supor, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 24, 2007, http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2007-12/24/content_6344205.htm; Xiao Wan, Nod to Alstom to Buy Wuhan
Boiler Stake, C I|NA DAILY, July 12, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2007-07/1 2/content_543 3319.
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equity holdings exceeded fifty percent and the state granted approvals (againstoppositions by
domestic competitors).125

Since the AML entered into force, the MOFCOM has published three decisions on
foreign-related concentrations. The MOFCOM approved the InBev N.V/S.A and
Anheuser-Busch merger on November 18, 2008.126 But given the size of the acquisition,
the large market share represented, and the competitiveness of the new company to be
established, 127 some conditions have been imposed. The company has to reduce possible
adverse effects on future competition in the Chinese beer market, both parties shall not
increase their holdings of the relevant Chinese breweries, and any further acquiring or
increasing stakes in certain breweries must be approved by the MOFCOM.l2 8 Although
the first publication of the anti-monopoly examination result with the legal remedies
should be welcomed for improved transparency in operation, concerns have been raised
about its lack of substantive information in the one page decision. 129 The latest approval
with restrictive conditions was granted to the US$1.6 billion takeover of Lucite Interna13
tional of the United Kingdom by Mitsubishi Rayon of Japan.
The first disapproval based on the AML was the MOFCOM-rejected proposed acquisition of Huiyuan, the largest juice maker in China, by Coca-Cola through a wholly owned
subsidiary for HK$17.9 billion. 131 The one and a half page decision apparently leaves
more questions than answers. The decision identified the focus of MOFCOM in scrutinizing the proposed merger under Article 27 of the AML, including the negative impacts
of the merger on the competitive level of the market, the combination of two well-known
brands, and the pressure on domestic small and mid-sized enterprises. 132 But without any
further explanation and justification, the rejection does not seem convincing or transparent enough. According to some experts, the fruit juice market in China has been very
open and fully competitive without any discernable elements of a business monopoly.
Currently, the per capita consumption of fruit juice is less than one kilogram, far below
133
the average annual consumption of fifty to seventy kilograms in developed countries.
125. See France SEB Completes Takeover of China's Spor, supra note 124; Nod to Alstom to Buy Wuhan Boiler
Stake, supra note 124; see also Lu Pingxin, Jiedu 2007 Nian Waizi Binggou Dasbjan [Understanding Large
Foreign M&As in 2007], 12 FAREN [LEGAL PERSONS] 2007, at 38-41.
126. Michael J. de la Merced, Anbeuser-Busch Agrees to Be Sold to InBev, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2008, htp://
topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/anheuser busch-companies/index.html.
127. After the merger, the Anheuser-Busch InBev would be the world's largest beer company and a top-five
consumer products company. For the details of the merger, see Press Release, Anheuser-Busch Companies,
InBev and Anheuser Busch Agree to Combine, Creating the Global Leader in Beer with Budweiser as its
Flagship Brand (July 13, 2008), available at http://www.anheuser-busch.com/Press/Presslmages/
FINAL%20PRESS%20RELEASE.pdf.
128. MOFCOM, The People's Republic of China Ministry of Commerce Announcement [2008] No. 95,
Nov. 18, 2008, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200811/20081105899216.html.
129. Jun Wei & Janet McDavid, Explaining China'sAnti-Monopoly Law, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 19, 2009, http://
www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticlelntl.jsp?id= 1202429178088.
130. Antitrust in China, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 2009, at 8.
131. Id.
132. MOFCOM, The People's Republic of China Ministry of Commerce Announcement [2009] No. 22
(Ministry of Commerce on the Prohibition of Coca-Cola's acquisition of China firm Huiyuan firm), Mar. 18,
20 09
03/20090306108494.html.
2009, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/
133. The Huiyuan Internal Public Figures Refer to the Coca-Cola Operation Purchase, ZIIONGGUO PINGLUN
XINwEN [CHINA REX'. NEWIS], Mar. 21, 2008, http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/l009/1/9/7/10091975
9.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid= 100919759.
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As such, the MOFCOM decision has not only divided scholars,1 34 but also put the
1 35
MOFCOM on the defensive to deny any protectionism behind its decision.
Recently, the MOFCOM published the statistics of its market concentration examinations. In the period from August 1, 2008 through the end of June 2009, the MOFCOM
received fifty-eight concentration notifications.3 6 Among the forty-six finished cases, all
were approved, aside from one rejection and two approvals with restrictive conditions as
37
highlighted above.
The first batch of anti-monopoly decisions has no doubt demonstrated the government's seriousness about implementing the AML. At the same time, it has also shown
that the detailed competition rules are still in the early stages of development. As a result,
the decisions may not be consistent, predictable, and transparent enough as expected in
the practice. Moreover, in terms of justification it is advised that in enforcing the AMIL
the government should not "confuse antitrust with industrial policy" in order to avoid the
38
accusation of protectionism.
IV. Some Further Concerns
China has come a long way in a short time to have integrated in the global economy
with its commitments to a market economy. The establishment of an anti-monopoly regime as a crucial institution to support the healthy economic development of the country
may be taken as the latest evidence in this regard. But because of China's socialist market
economy, the development of an anti-monopoly regime may face some tough institutional
challenges in addition to many technical difficulties.
Perhaps most important, it should be noted that the establishment of an effective competition and anti-monopoly regime may have profound political implications on democratic governance in China. As an economically level playing field is being built up for
more equal competition, the model of the totalitarian governance will inevitably be challenged. Despite the desire of leadership to utilize capitalist tools to modernize socialism
in China with the ultimate goal being to remain in power and not to liberalize, 139 the
inherent conflict of the two systems becomes unavoidable and may eventually become a
real threat to the entire political regime. 140 As such, it would be a daunting question to be
answered in China as to what extent political democracy and equal entitlement on the
market can be compatible with the economic growth. In this context, the enactment of
134. For the different views held by domestic scholars, see Jin Sun, The Implementation ofChina'sAnti-Monop-

oly
Law: A Case Study on Coca-Cola's Abortive Acquisition of Huiyuan Juice, P-RSPECTIVES:

CIINA AND

THE

WORLD, 2009, http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article-print.asp?articleid=48398;

see also Ron Knox, The GCR
poll: Coca-Cola/Huiyuan,GLOBAL COMPETITION REv., Mar. 30, 2009, http://www.globalcompetitionreview.
com/news/article/1 3154.
135. "No Protectionism" in Coca-Cola Ruling, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 19, 2009, http://english.
mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/counselorsreport/americaandoceanreport200903/20090306117020.hnml.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Antitrust inChina, supra note 130.
139. Perry Link & Joshua Kurlantzick, China'sModern Authoritarianism,WALL ST. J. AsIA, May 25, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124319304482150525.htnl.
140. William I. Friedman, One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent Conflict Between China's Communist Politics
and CapitalistSecurities Market, 27 BROOK. J. INtr'L L. 477, 516 (2002).
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the AML has been viewed as a "catalyst to accelerate China's political reform" and raised
the expectation of the private sector to use the AML to fight for a fair market.141
To the government's great surprise, the first batch of lawsuits filed under the AML were
not disputes between competing enterprises, but were brought by small and mid-sized
private enterprises against government administrations. Within eighteen days after the
AML became effective, the State Administration of Products Quality Inspection was
named as a defendant in three cases citing abuse of administrative powers in blocking
market access by way of monopolized and compulsory licensing, certifying and fee charging.142 It was also further reported that a department head of the Administration committed suicide in this period after the allegations triggered some criminal investigation on the
violations dealing with fee profit. 143 Thus far, the Court has refused to accept the lawsuits
on the grounds of statutory limitations. 144 Later, some private firms tried to sue two large
state-controlled companies, Sinopec and China National Petroleum, for alleged market
monopolistic conduct, which resulted in the closing of 663 private oil dealers and 45,000
gas stations. 145 Some consumers have also instituted actions against China Mobile, the
largest domestic operator of mobile phones, for its abuse of a dominant market
46
position.1
Although none of these cases have seen any concrete results, such a dynamic start to the
implementation of the AML clearly demonstrates not only the strong demands of the
private sector and consumers for a level playing field in the market, but also profound
political implications in challenging Party-State governance in the country. But given the
political reality in China, it is predicted that the challenges to the government branches
and state-controlled market giants may not go anywhere in the near future.
In China, the implantation of a foreign-direct-investment-driven and export-orientated
manufacturing approach over the last thirty years has inevitably led to the accumulation
and domination of foreign investment in certain areas. 147 The government's ferocious
protection of the state sector from competition has created even further market concentration with administrative power.' 48 Thus, although some developing countries, including China and India, have been supporting a strategy of promoting "national champions,"
the potential abuse and impact on private sector development are much more serious in
China. As Professor Yasheng Huang from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
pointed out, excessively relying on foreign investment is a reflection of an irrational domestic financial and legal system, which would inevitably lead to aggressive expansion of
141. Wang Ye, Rushi Cuisheng Zhongguo Falongdua Fa [Birth Accession to the WTO China'sAnti-Monopoly Lawl,
FAXUE WANG [LEGAL SCIENCE WEBSITE OF CHINA], http://www.iolaw.org.cn/shownews.asp?id=242, at 1.
142. Wu Jianping, Director General Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection Jumped to his Death?,
CI IINACOURT, Aug. 14, 2008, http://bbs.chinacourt.org/index.php?showtopic=29245 1.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Liu Yong, China's Independents To Sue Oil Majors Over Fuel, CHINA DIGrrAL TES, Oct. 13, 2008,
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/10/chinas-independents-to-sue-oil-majors-over-fueUl.
146. Juliet Ye, Anti-Monopoly Law Inspires Consumer Suit Against China Mobile, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2009,
availableat http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/04/06/anti-monopoly-law-inspires-consumer-suit-against-chinamobile/.
147. Huang & Tarun Khanna, Can India Overtake China?, FOREIGN POLICY, July/Aug. 2003, at 74.
148. Id. at 75.
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149
Moreover, development under this model is made at the cost
multinationals in China.
of domestic-sector development. As a result, the crucial problem facing China is not an
excessive openness to foreign investors, but a seriously insufficient opening to the domes50
tic private sector.1 In this regard, economic and institutional liberalization in China is
much more challenging, not only because the private sector may bring more competition
to the market, but also because privatization has been highly sensitive in China because of
its status as a socialist country.'s'
According to some scholars, the biased anti-monopoly enactment on the ground of national economic safety, with the different standards applicable to domestic administrative
monopoly and foreign expansion respectively, would obliterate the essence of the law and
further harm domestic consumers who have suffered from the callous administrative monopoly on the market for a long time. In this sense, foreign M&As in China, which have
subjected the government and the public sector Lo conlpetitive pressure and accelerated
the anti-monopoly legislation, are even thought of as a good thing from the perspective of
52
Moreover, it is predicted that biased competithe rule of law development in China.'
15 3
tion legislation will have considerable vitality.

In terms of a development path, close attention has been paid to the experiences of both
the European Union (EU) and the United States in developing their anti-monopoly legal
regimes. The current AML of China is influenced far more by the EU regime due to its
civil law tradition and diversified economic development. As a result, private enforcement
and strong judicial participation, two of the main features of American antitrust laws, are
154
Moreover, divergences between the antinot incorporated into the current framework.
monopoly laws of China and the United States arise because the principles under the
AML are still based on regulations with political, social, and ideological considerations,
whereas these principles have been replaced by economic principles in the United
States. 5 5 Indeed, China has insisted that the model of its economic development may not
be the same as the ones of developed countries with different social-political and economic conditions. Some experts argue that in a developing country like China, current
economic conditions should be adequately considered in formulating competition law and
policy. As a result, promotion of domestic economic development should be the primary
goal of the current anti-monopoly legislation. Thus the government-driven economy (ev15
idenced by such devices as the "national champion" policy), 6 although opposed by devel149. Id. at 74.
150. YASHEUNG HuANG, SELLING CHINA: FOREIGN DIREcT INVESTMENT DURING THE REFORM ERA

(2003).
151. China's Coming Recession, ECONOMIST, May 2, 1998 (even after the reform of the past two decades,
"privatization is still a dirty word in China"); Toshiki Kanamori & Zhijun Zhao, Private Sector Development in
the People's Republic of China, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, Sept, 2004, at 43-57; PrivateSector Assessment. The
People's Republic of China, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, Nov. 2003, at 32-40; Howell supra note 99.
152. Qui Feng, The Logical Disarray of Anti-monopoly, NANFANG Dusm BAO [SOuTHEIRN METROPOLIS
DAILY], Mar. 16, 2006, at A3.
153. PETER J. WANG, ET AL.,NEW CHINESE ATrI-MONOPOLY LAW (Oct. 2007), http://www.jonesday.

corr/pubs/pubs-detail.aspx?publD=S4662.
154. Nicholas H. Cramer, Progressand Uncertainty: The Development and Implementation of a United Competition
Regime in the People's Republic Of China, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NFTWORK, June 1, 2008, http:/I
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfrnahstractid= 1175542#.
155. Howell, supra note 99, at 54.
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oped countries, should still be carefully considered given China's needs.' 57 Against this
background, the anti-monopoly regime in China will take more time to develop and will
see some fundamental differences from the developed countries in the near future.
On the international level, China's short WTO membership has not allowed her to
develop any sophisticated theory or position to deal with competition policy in the global
context, which was one of the so-called Singapore Issues of the VVTO when it was on the
discussion table. A recent search on the MOFCOM web site did not reveal any official
policy statement or submission in this regard.158 But according to Professor Wang
Xiaoye, a leading expert of competition law in China, 5 9 the proposal of the European
Union to establish a uniform competition regime within the WTO framework was widely
supported, and China should take a proactive attitude toward participation in the multilateral negotiations. She further believes that such an agreement would restrain multinational corporations' unfair competition practices in China, and thus, China should accept
the European Union's proposal of the non-discriminatory application of national treatment 60 It is interesting to note that this position appears quite different from the one
insisted on by the Indian Government and scholars against the European Union's proposal to extend the "national treatment" principle automatically to competition policy of the
61
WTO members.'
It should also be noted that WTO membership has brought further pressure on China
to improve its competition policy and market conditions.162 For example, in June 2008,
Canada and the United States requested consultation with China with respect to measures
that would require foreign financial information suppliers to provide their services only
through a designated official agent, rather than directly soliciting subscribers for their
services in China. They claimed that such a practice was inconsistent with the provisions
on market access and national treatment of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS). 163 The dispute ended with the promulgation of a new decree by Chinese authorities that allows foreign institutions to provide information services directly to their subscribers in China under the government's approval.' 64 Recently, the VVTO panel handed
157. Huang Yong & Li Zhiqiang, Conflict of Laws and InternationalCooperation in Antitrust Enforcement, in
NEW DEVELOPMENI- OF ComPFrrrION LAW UNDER GLOBALIZATION 224-25 (Wang Xiaoye ed., 2002).

158. Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM), http://english.mofconi.gov.cn/
(last visited Aug. 26, 2009).
159. See WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 156.
160. Xiaoye, supra note 17.
161. See W/TO Document: Communication from India, WT/WGTCP/W/216, Sept. 26, 2002; Aditya
Bhattacharjea, India's Competition Policy: An Assessment, 38 EcoN. & POL. WKLY. 3561, 3570-73 (2003);
Rakesh Basant & Sebastian Morris, Competition Policy in India: Issues for a Globalising Economy, 35 ECON. &
PoL. WKLY. 2735, 2746 (2000); Adita Bhattacharjea, Export Cartel-A Developing Country Perspective, 38 J.
WORLD TRADE 331, 355 (2004).

162. Foreign Investment IndustrialGuidance Catalogue (Amended in 2007), P.R.C. L. & PRAc., Dec. 2007-Jan.
2008, http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/1853571/Channe/9950/Foreign-Investment-IndustrialGuidance-Catalogue-Amended-in-2007.html.
163. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, arts. 16-18, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M.
1125.
164. Joint Communication from China and Canada, China-MeasuresAffecting FinancialInfo Services and Foreign FinancialInformation Suppliers, WT/DS378/3 (Dec. 9, 2008); see also WTO, Dispute Settlement: DS378
(2009) http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu-e/cases-e/ds378_e.htm (summarizing the dispute); Provisions on Administration of Provision of Financial Information Services in China by Foreign Institutions, BEIJING
REVIEW, Jul. 2009, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2009-07/20/content_208369.htm.
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down another decision on the dispute between the United States and China on China's
domestic measures to, inter alia, reserve the trading rights with respect to imported films,
audiovisual entertainment products, sound recording, and publications to state designated
or owned enterprises. The panel found that such measures were inconsistent with the
rules of the WTO, including the national treatment and market access commitments
under the GATS.165 These WTO proceedings will no doubt play an important role by
challenging the state monopoly to pave a new level playing field under the non-discrimination principle.
The lack of expertise may also pose a serious challenge to the smooth implementation
of the AML. For instance, the function of the AML gets into an awkward situation from
the very beginning because only one of the approximately forty detailed regulations that
have been prepared under the state implementation plan was promulgated when the AML
became effective.166 Some foreign experts even questioned whether the AML was a
"source of uncertainty or a new economic constitution." 1 67 In this regard, a recent study
found that there were few officials capable of carrying out their duties of competition law

enforcement with professional qualification and specialized knowledge.168
Last but not the least, the role of the judiciary in enforcing the relevant laws may also
raise a serious concern. In China, the checks and balances principle has not been recognized, and thus the judiciary may have only limited independence and may be subject to
the budgetary and personnel control of the government as well as its policy influence. As
a result, despite continuing reform in the last decade, the quality of judicial independence
169
and impartiality is stil questionable.
Such an infrastructure gap may be illustrated with an interesting case in China, where a
patient in Sichuan Province found there was no medicine name on her prescription issued
by a local hospital, but only some unreadable code so that the medicine could only be
purchased from the hospital. 170 She filed her complaint with the local office of the SAIC.
The investigation found that the hospital was selling outdated drugs and that the unreadable code violated the patient's right to information as stipulated in the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.' 7 ' The hospital, however, filed a legal action against the local SAIC for
unlawful enforcement. 172 The People's Court ruled in favor of the hospital on the
grounds that the hospital was only subject to the supervision of the Ministry of Public
165. Panel Report, China-MeasuresAffecting Trading Rights and DistributionServicesfor Certain Publicationand
Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12, 2009), available at htp://www.wto.org/english/
newse/news09 e/363r_e.hmtn.
166. Xin Hong, Anti-Monopoly Law Face Dilemma: More than 40 Supporting Regulations Without an Introduction,
XINHUA NEWS, Aug. 1, 2008, http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20080727/11055136074.shtml.
167. Paul Jones, China's New Anti-Monopoly Law: An Economic Constitution for the New Market Economy?, 3
P.R.C. L. Riu'. 2007, at 3, 12; see also
Joanna Law, Anti-Monopoly Law: The Lawyers Are Ready, But the Law
Isn't, P.R.C. L. & PRAc., Jul./Aug. 2008, at 10-16.
168. ZHONGWvAI FANLONGDUAN FA SHISHI Tizhn YANJiU [A STUDY ON IMPLEMFENTFATION SYSTEMIS OF
ANTIAONOPOLY LAW IN CHINA AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES] 318 (Liu Junjing ed. 2005).

169. ALBERT HUNG-YEE CItAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF TinE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
or CHINA 131-59 (3rd ed. LexisNexis, 2007) (1992).
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277-90 (2004).
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Health, and thus the SAIC had no authority to carry out its enforcement measures.
The appeal of the SAIC put the appellant People's Court in a very difficult position between two state authorities.174 Finally, the case ended with a conciliation of the parties
concerned for saving both sides' faith. While being interviewed, the judges indicated that
in such a tough situation the court may not be able to firmly support the implementation
of antimonopoly/unfair competition rules.175

Directly before the AML entered into force, the Supreme People's Court issued a twopage circular on July 28, 2008 to local People's Courts on the implementation of the
AMIL.176 In addition to the requirements to study the AMIL carefully and to summarize
trial experience in a timely manner, the Supreme People's Court assigns hearings of the
AML related cases to the Intellectual Property Tribunal within the court system. Although anti-monopoly-law-related cases do not all fall into the jurisdiction of intellectual
property trials, the current arrangement of concentrated jurisdiction is made due to the
tribunal's experience in handling unfair competition claims and reflects a cautious ap177
proach taken by the Supreme People's Court in the early time of the implementation.
Soon after, the Supreme People's Court openly admitted that handling antimonopoly
cases would be very challenging to the judiciary. In particular, seven areas that are governed by no clear rules or no rules at all have been identified: (1) jurisdiction over antimonopoly cases; (2) standing of a plaintiff; (3) legal remedies and compensations; (4)
other types of monopolies beyond the AML provisions; (5) procedural issues; (6) tests
applicable to antimonopoly cases; and (7) the relations between antimonopoly and intellectual property right protection. Rules for these areas are needed urgently in order to
effectively implement the AML.'78
Despite many uncertainties, the Supreme People's Court has made clear that in implanting the AML against administrative monopoly, the People's Court will only accept
legal actions against concrete administrative decisions, and not those against government
provisions, regulations, and policies.1 79 As such, a government monopoly policy can
neither be sued, nor subject to other legal enforcement schemes. 8 0° The recent reports
that many local governments have adopted various protectionist measures during the international financial crisis in order to protect local products and enterprises have further
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(Sept 8. 2008), http://www.zwmscp.com/list.asp?unid=8048.
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180. Administrative Procedure Law art. 12 (adopted by the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1989, effective Apr. 4, 1989), Supreme People's Court of the P.R.C., http://
en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2695 (last visited Aug. 26, 2009); Anti-monopoly Law, supra note 4,
art. 51.
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illustrated the gravity of the challenge. 181 In this sense, the law is called "a tiger without
82
teeth."1

V.

Conclusion

The adoption of the AML is a milestone in China's market development and has received a world-wide welcome. The legislative history of more than a decade and the serious efforts to learn from other countries reflects the government's commitment to a
market economy with an more-level playing field. But China's socialist market economy
has provided the antimonopoly legal regime with some unique characteristics, including
special concerns with administrative monopoly, the equal and rational treatment to all
market players, and the independence and impartiality of enforcement authorities. Moreover, the introduction of the Anti-monopoly Law in China will inevitably have a profound

impact far beyond the legislation itself. Thus the current legislation may just be an encouraging beginning. I8 3 But the Anti-monopoly Law and its practice may not be effectively advanced unless further political reform and competition culture are well developed
84
in China.
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